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The Federal Government’s Power to Restrict State Taxation
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
Over a decade ago, State Tax Notes featured a lively
discussion concerning Congress’s power to restrict the tax-
ing power of the states. That debate revolved around two
questions. First, could Congress prohibit the use of the state
corporate income tax altogether? Second, assuming that
Congress could not prohibit the use of the corporate income
tax, could it impose lesser restrictions, such as P.L. 86-272?
There was no clear guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court
on those issues then, and that mostly remains the case
today.1
To foreshadow our conclusions: Our take on that debate
is that while Congress probably lacks the power to abolish
state-level corporate income taxes,2 the federal government
almost certainly does have the power to prevent the states
from taxing much else — such as the retirement income of
nonresidents,3 internet access,4 or interstate businesses with
limited nexus.5 Indeed, there seems to have been a general
consensus on that latter conclusion, both among scholars6
and in congressional statements and analysis.7 Moreover,
the federal government limits state taxing authority in just
1Michael T. Fatale, ‘‘Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional
Limitations On Congressional Preemptions Of State Tax,’’ 2012 Mich.
St. L. Rev. 41, 45 (‘‘The Court has not yet posited any rules to protect
the states from federal preemptions in the state tax area’’).
2See, e.g., Fatale, id. at 42 (‘‘It cannot be the case that the U.S.
Congress has unfettered authority to preempt state taxes pursuant to
the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause’’). Fatale cites Alexander
Hamilton for the general proposition that ‘‘a law for abrogating or
preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the States
(unless upon imports and exports) would not be the supreme law of the
land, but a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution.’’ Id.
at 44 (citing Federalist 33).
34 U.S.C. section 114.
4Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. section 151 note.
5P.L. 86-272.
6The relevant section in the authoritative Hellerstein treatise is
short and it essentially concludes that there is little question that
Congress can do the small amount it has done, such as P.L. 86-272 and
the other statutes discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
39-48, and the incremental changes that have also been proposed that
it do, such as pass the Mainstreet Fairness Act. The question of broader
reforms, such as forbidding use of the corporate income tax, is not
addressed. Jerome R. Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein, and John Swain,
State Taxation para. 4.24 (‘‘Some of the Court’s more recent decisions
construing Congress’s affirmative power under the Commerce Clause
have taken a narrower view of that power than the Court articulated
during the New Deal era, when it sustained the broad exercise of
congressional power to regulate even local activities that may affect
interstate commerce. But those decisions do not seriously inhibit the
broad powers that Congress plainly possesses to deal with virtually any
of the significant contemporary problems raised by state taxation of
interstate commerce, such as prescribing uniform division of income
tax rules, empowering the states to collect use taxes on mail-order sales,
limiting the states’ power to tax transactions over the Internet, or
establishing tax-free trade zones’’) (citing in particular Prudential In-
surance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946)); see also State
Taxation of Nonresidents’ Pension Income: Hearings on H.R. 371,
H.R. 394, and H.R. 744 Before the Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 24 (1995) (statement of professor James C. Smith); and
Tracey A. Kaye, ‘‘Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations On
State Tax Sovereignty,’’ 35 Harv. J. on Legis. 149, 174 (1998) (‘‘As the
Court today would most likely interpret the Commerce Clause as
constitutionally permitting Congress to preempt the states’ tax sover-
eignty, the debate is properly shifted to whether the federal government
should exercise its authority to do so’’).
7See, e.g., H. Rep. 104-89 at 5 (‘‘Congress has the clear authority
under the commerce clause of the Constitution to prohibit State
taxation of nonresidents’ pension income’’).
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those ways.8 Some of those limitations have been upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court from other challenges.9
Yet there are a few reasons why it is now critical to revisit
that debate, the task we take for ourselves in this essay. First,
in our recent scholarship, we have explained how the state
corporate income tax is problematic for reasons not previ-
ously understood — namely, the damage that existing state-
level corporate income taxes do to the federal fisc through
‘‘tax cannibalization.’’ We therefore will consider whether
that new reason tilts the constitutional balance such that
prohibiting state corporate income taxes might now be
permitted. Even if banning state corporate income taxation
would still be prohibited, our analysis points to a wide range
of additional limitations on the states’ use of corporate
income taxation that could be desirable from the perspective
of the federal government. We therefore consider whether
these other policy expedients might pass constitutional
muster.
There are two other reasons to reconsider that debate.
First, Michael Fatale, the primary — and formidable —
proponent of the argument that even P.L. 86-272 might be
unconstitutional, in 2012 published a law review article
reprising and refining his argument. Second, the Supreme
Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius10 has the potential to change the relevant
landscape. At least some prominent commentators have
suggested that that opinion could augur a gestalt change in
federal-state relations.11 We will consider whether such a
shift might affect federal power over state taxation.
I. The 2002 Debate
The contours of the debate can be stated relatively briefly.
In an important 2002 article in State Tax Notes, Kirk Stark
laid out the policy argument that the state corporate income
tax is a poor tax and should be reassigned to the federal
government.12 The core of Stark’s argument was that the
corporate income tax is a tax on a mobile factor — namely,
capital — and subnational jurisdictions are not well situated
to impose a tax on mobile factors. Put prosaically, it is too
easy for corporations to play states against each other so as to
whittle away the state corporate income tax base. Of course,
underlying Stark’s argument was the assumption that the
federal government could abolish the state corporate income
tax base.13 Stark held up P.L. 86-272 as a small step in that
direction.14
Independently, in 2000, Walter Hellerstein published an
article in the National Tax Journal addressing the extent of
federal power over state tax bases.15 Hellerstein’s particular
concern was whether Congress had the power to regulate
electronic commerce — specifically whether to overturn
Quill and impose some national solution on the states, as the
Supreme Court in Quill suggested that Congress could do.
Hellerstein said that recent Court decisions that imposed
limitations on Congress’s power under the commerce
clause16 could be read as limiting its power to impose
limitations of that sort. Hellerstein concluded that the
Court’s ‘‘new federalism’’ decisions of the 1990s did not
limit Congress’s power to impose a uniform solution on the
states concerning electronic commerce. Among other rea-
sons, that was because the new federalism decisions clipped
congressional power regarding regulations of activity not
clearly ‘‘commercial,’’ such as guns near schools, but the
congressional limitation of state regulation of electronic
commerce was not similarly infirm because electronic com-
merce is clearly commerce.17
Taking the other side, and forcefully, was Michael Fa-
tale.18 Fatale argued that the Court, especially after the new
federalism cases, would apply a balancing test to evaluate
federal intrusions onto the state taxing power.19 Fatale
thought the Court would be especially skeptical of congres-
sional regulations that regulated a sovereign activity of the
states, such as taxation. But Fatale also observed the many
well-known limitations of P.L. 86-272, which was not sur-
prising given its provenance as a temporary expedient. For
instance, Fatale said, P.L. 86-272 favors large businesses
relative to small businesses, just the opposite of what Con-
gress ostensibly wanted. Thus, Fatale says we have, on the
8See discussion infra.
9See, e.g., Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, 464 U.S.
7 (1983).
10NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595-2597 (2012).
11See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, ‘‘How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the
Constitutional Gestalt,’’ 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1 (2013).
12Kirk J. Stark, ‘‘The Quiet Revolution in U.S. Subnational Cor-
porate Income Taxation,’’ State Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2002, p. 775.
13Id. at 783.
14Id.
15Hellerstein, ‘‘Federal Constitutional Limitations on Congressio-
nal Power to Legislate Regarding State Taxation of Electronic Com-
merce,’’ 53 Nat’l Tax J. 1307 (2000).
16U.S. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 3.
17Id. at 1314. Thus, for instance, the problem in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000), was that the federal law struck
down targeted ‘‘gender-motivated’’ crimes, which are not ‘‘economic
activity.’’ At the same time, the Court reemphasized its broad sense of
‘‘commerce’’ for purposes of commerce clause analysis. See id. at
608-09 (2000) (‘‘As we observed in Lopez, modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress may
regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally,
Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e.,
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce’’) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
18Fatale, ‘‘Federalism and State Business Activity Tax Nexus: Revis-
iting Public Law 86-272,’’ State Tax Notes, June 3, 2002, p. 925,
published in revised and expanded form in 21 Va. Tax Rev. 435-506
(2002).
19Fatale, 21 Va. Tax Rev., id. at 465-67.
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one side, a substantial federal intrusion into state sover-
eignty being weighed against a law that does not make much
sense.20 Thus, P.L. 86-272 is not constitutional and neither,
in all likelihood, would other intrusions on state taxing
power be.
Fatale’s articles brought many responses that pushed for
the constitutionality of P.L. 86-272.21 The reasons are ulti-
mately similar to Hellerstein’s and argue that P.L. 86-272 is
directly designed to facilitate interstate commerce and thus
is categorically safe, even if there were consensus that it is
ill-conceived.
But what about the question posed by Stark’s analysis:
Could Congress ban use of the corporate income tax alto-
gether? Michael McIntryre said no, but not on the basis of
the Court’s new federalism decisions. According to McIn-
tyre, the problem with banning a general tax base is that
such a ban is insufficiently connected with Congress’s un-
derlying power to regulate commerce.22 McIntyre appears
to have had the last word on that question, as scholarly
debate moved on to other topics.
II. Some New(ish) Developments
A. Introducing the Tax Cannibalization Problem
What we have called the ‘‘tax cannibalization problem’’
could arise within any federal system in which the central
government shares a tax base with subnational govern-
ments.23 We will now illustrate the problem with the ex-
ample of the corporate income tax.24 As readers of State Tax
Notes know well, state-level corporate income taxes are
vulnerable to a variety of distortionary responses that shrink
the states’ corporate income tax bases. Those distortionary
responses include various forms of tax avoidance and tax
gaming. It is useful to divide those distortionary responses
into two conceptual categories.
The first conceptual category consists of distortionary
responses that involve taxable activity relocating to other
states. We label this category ‘‘horizontal distortions.’’ Be-
cause horizontal distortions involve taxable activity relocat-
ing across state lines but remaining within the United States,
they do not necessarily shrink the federal government’s
corporate income tax base. Important examples of horizon-
tal distortionary responses to state-level corporate income
tax rates include corporate taxpayers shifting their physical
presence and sales activities from states that levy higher-rate
corporate income taxes to states that levy lower-rate corpo-
rate income taxes. It is because of the prevalence of horizon-
tal distortions that Stark argued that the state corporate
income tax ought to be jettisoned.
The second conceptual category consists of the remain-
ing distortionary responses that do not involve taxable ac-
tivity relocating to other states. We label this category ‘‘ver-
tical distortions.’’ In contrast to horizontal distortions,
vertical distortions do typically shrink the federal govern-
ment’s corporate income tax base. Important examples of
vertical distortionary responses to state-level corporate in-
come tax rates include corporate taxpayers shifting real
investment activities abroad, corporate taxpayers shifting
reported profits to subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions, cor-
porate taxpayers shifting from equity financing to debt
financing, and business taxpayers shifting from the use of
corporate forms to the use of partnership forms.
Vertical distortionary responses are the primary source of
the tax cannibalization problem. Because vertical distortion-
ary responses shrink both the state government’s corporate
income tax base and the federal government’s corporate
income tax base, vertical distortionary responses to state-
level corporate income tax rates deprive the federal govern-
ment of tax revenue.
Moreover, the federal government levies much higher tax
rates on the bases of corporate income, ordinary income,
and capital gains than do any state governments. Conse-
quently, the federal government suffers much greater harm
from vertical distortionary responses to state-level tax rates
on those bases than do the state governments setting those
tax rates.
Here is a very simple example.25 Suppose a corporation
engages in vertically distortionary responses — say profit
shifting — because of the additional 8.84 percent corporate
tax imposed by California. Suppose the corporation shields
$1 million in additional profits and California thus loses
$88,400 of tax revenue as a consequence. Note that the
federal fisc potentially loses $350,000, because the rate at
the federal level is 35 percent.
When vertical distortionary responses to a state govern-
ment’s tax rate deprive both the federal government and
other states’ governments of revenue, in the aggregate, we
refer to that as tax cannibalization. As we argue at length in
20Id. at 479-92.
21Scott M. Zimmerman and Richard P. Schweitzer, ‘‘Public Law
86-272 Is Constitutional,’’ StateTax Notes, June 24, 2002, p. 1207; and
Diann L. Smith, ‘‘Supreme Court Would Uphold P.L. 86-272,’’ State
Tax Notes, July 8, 2002, p. 135.
22Michael J. McIntyre, ‘‘Thoughts on the Future of the State
Corporate Income Tax,’’ State Tax Notes, Sept. 23, 2002, p. 931.
McIntyre’s argument does not rely on the ghost of the intergovern-
mental tax immunity doctrine, though it would be possible to find that
that much reduced doctrine would prevent Congress from taxing the
state taxing power directly. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505,
520-523, nn. 11-13 (1988) (outlining continued limited role of doc-
trine in protecting states); and State of New York v. United States, 326
U.S. 572, 582 (1946) (classic cite standing for proposition that federal
government could not tax state as a state).
23See Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Fed-
eralism in the United States,’’ Nw. U. L. Rev., Forthcoming. A draft of
the paper is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2750933.
24Our explanation above closely follows the introductory explana-
tion in our longer article, id. at 1-5. 25We go through much more detail in the complete paper.
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our forthcoming article, there is reason to believe that the
scale of that tax cannibalization is substantial.
In the context of our system of fiscal federalism, the tax
cannibalization problem indicates that the federal govern-
ment should encourage states to use tax bases that the
federal government does not use, which could mean major
bases, such as the retail sales tax or the property tax, or
perhaps shifting to other forms of taxation, such as value
added taxes, including unusual or hybrid ones like New
Hampshire’s business enterprise tax.26 To that end, the
federal government could use a carrot-and-stick approach,
with those carrots or sticks small or large. Banning the use of
state corporate income taxes would be a very big stick, while
expanding P.L. 86-272 would be a relatively small one.
Large direct subsidies would be a big carrot, while enabling
easier collection of other kinds of taxes, say by overturning
Quill, would be a little one.
Mitigating the tax cannibalization problem could also
involve federal discouragement of state tax incentives. We
will develop this argument in a subsequent article, but the
gist is that if a state is to share a tax base with the federal
government, the lower the state’s tax rates, the less cannibal-
ization is likely to occur. States have the incentive to keep
rates low in order to attract businesses, but that incentive is
dulled by the availability of tax incentives. Thanks to special
tax breaks for mobile businesses, states can keep their rates
high while in effect reducing the rates for specific businesses.
Could Congress ban the use of tax incentives? Could Con-
gress discourage the use of tax incentives by, in effect, taxing
them through the federal income tax?
Given the clear federal interest in using such policy
expedients to influence state tax structures, the question
becomes, Just what can Congress do? The previous discus-
sion assumed that federal intervention would explicitly aim
to enable interstate commerce. Does the analysis change if
Congress is seeking to protect its own revenue?
B. NFIB v. Sebelius
In the earlier rounds of the debate, one question was how
and whether the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine
would affect the limits of federal power over state taxation.
As we discussed, the consensus, with which we agree, was
that those earlier opinions on the limits of commerce would
not have much impact in the area of state taxation. How-
ever, in NFIB v. Sebelius, the first big Obamacare decision,
the Supreme Court expanded the reach of the commandeer-
ing doctrine, which has its roots in limiting Congress’s
power under the commerce clause.27 NFIB v. Sebelius ex-
tends the reach of that doctrine to the spending power and
suggests similar limits to the taxing power.28 The Court held
that Congress could not tie continued federal support for
Medicaid to states’ agreeing to expand Medicaid.
It is important not just that the commandeering doctrine
was applied to the spending power, but how. In NFIB v.
Sebelius, the Court did not forbid Congress from using the
power of the purse to cajole states to follow a federal lead,
but it did forbid Congress from using that power too
much.29
Does NFIB v. Sebelius have any impact on our question?
The decision is recent and Delphic at points.30 There are
readings that suggest that NFIB v. Sebelius might have a
major impact on the shape of constitutional law.31 That is
because in its analysis of congressional power under the
commerce clause, the Court sketched out limits on congres-
sional power that suggest discomfort with the court’s post-
New Deal expansion of the commerce power.32 Viewed
from that perspective, the first-ever application of the com-
mandeering principle to the spending clause implies that the
Court might take a more jaundiced view of congressional
restriction of the state taxing power. Note that this section of
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.’s opinion was joined by
Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Elena Kagan.
C. Fatale’s Newest Entry Into the Fray
Moreover, we do not necessarily even need to try to read
Supreme Court tea leaves in order to imagine what a more
26We discuss the business enterprise tax briefly supra note 23, at
46-47.
27See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-66 (1992).
28132 S. Ct. at 2599-2600 (‘‘There comes a time in the extension of
the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as
such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation
and punishment. . . . Congress’s authority under the taxing power is
limited to requiring an individual to pay money into the Federal
Treasury, no more. . . . [I]mposition of a tax nonetheless leaves an
individual with a lawful choice to do or not do a certain act, so long as
he is willing to pay a tax levied on that choice’’) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
29NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (‘‘Nothing in our opinion
precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act
to expand the availability of health care, and requiring that States
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use. What
Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to
participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid
funding’’).
30Cf. Lynn A. Baker, ‘‘The Spending Power After NFIB v. Sebelius,’’
37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 71, 81(2014) (‘‘In conclusion, until the
Court takes up my final two questions in future cases, we cannot fully
understand the effect of the NFIB decision on spending power doc-
trine. The Court’s 1987 five-pronged Dole test seems no longer to be
the governing doctrine, but it is far from clear what has replaced it’’).
31See generally Solum supra note 11; see also Ernest A. Young,
‘‘Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem: The
Case of the National Healthcare Law,’’ 75 Law & Contemp. Probs. 157,
201 (2012) (‘‘The Supreme Court’s current doctrine underenforces
constitutional norms of federalism and economic liberty, and if that
doctrine remains intact, then it is hard to see how the ACA will not
ultimately survive the current challenges to its constitutionality. I have
tried to show, however, that underenforcement is a historically contin-
gent phenomenon, and doctrine that has shifted once can shift again’’).
32NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2585-2593.
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restrictive approach to federal regulation of state taxation
might look like, thanks to Fatale, who has refined and
elaborated on his argument.33 In a nutshell, his argument
has two steps. First, he argues that state taxes are not
commerce and hence cannot be regulated by the federal
government under the commerce power. Second, he argues
that the federal government can preempt state taxing power
only when the state tax is itself discriminatory against other
states, but not otherwise.34 Fatale acknowledges that his
argument is novel and would upend much of the little
Congress has already done in that area.
III. Where We Think We Stand Now
A. Impact of NFIB v. Sebelius
We think that the biggest impact of NFIB v. Sebelius is
that it provides a foundation for at least one pole of what we
take to be the consensus view — that Congress probably
cannot completely ban the use of a broad tax base by states.
A lot of the reason for that view seems to have been gut
feelings, based on shared intuitions, reinforced by the
Court’s repeated concern, in many contexts, for the fiscal
integrity of states.35 McIntryre attempted to give that sense
some analytical teeth by maintaining that such a ban would
not amount to regulating commerce at all. However, that
was not a satisfying hook, since so many of the reasons for
Congress to prohibit the use of the corporate income tax are
tied to its impact on the behavior of interstate businesses.36
Accordingly, NFIB v. Sebelius provides a better analytic
frame for thinking through the question. The following is
what we take to be a relatively minimalist reading of the
decision from a prominent commentator:
The Chief Justice’s pivotal opinion renders a spending
condition coercive only in very narrow circumstances:
Where Congress takes a (1) very large (2) preexisting
conditional spending program, and (3) tells the state
that if it wants to continue participating in the pro-
gram, it must also agree to participate in an entirely
separate and distinct program. In those circum-
stances, there is coercion.37
From that perspective, the issue with banning the state
corporate income tax has nothing to do with the unsatisfy-
ing conceptual question about whether it is ‘‘commerce’’ but
with the pragmatic question of what such a ban would do to
the states. Taking away a major tax base — and one in use —
would arguably affect the states too much.
However, note that unlike the Medicaid expansion, the
federal government could argue that such a ban would not
be designed to advance a distinct program but to improve
the overall system of interstate taxation. That is certainly a
relevant distinction, but we would not count on it being
convincingly dispositive, especially because the tax canni-
balization problem is particularly severe in the U.S. federal
system partly because of choices made by the federal gov-
ernment. For instance, if the federal government imposed
lower tax rates on broader bases, the tax cannibalization
problem would be far less severe.38
B. Fatale’s Argument as a Limit Case
We see Fatale’s argument as a demonstration for how a
new constitutional gestalt certainly could affect current and
contemplated federal limitations on the state taxing powers.
We also think Fatale’s argument is useful in that it demon-
strates how difficult it is to conceive of a principled limit on
the commerce power that restricts some, but not all, existing
federal limitations on state taxing power.
Before evaluating Fatale’s argument further, we should
provide some context. P.L. 86-272 is surely the broadest
intervention into state taxing power, but it is by no means
the only such intervention.39 Congress restricts the states
from taxing the internet directly,40 from taxing individuals
‘‘traveling in air commerce’’41 or interstate travel by motor
33There are traces in original. See, for instance, Fatale, 21 Va. Tax
Rev., supra note 19 at 467.
34Fatale, 2012 Mich. St. L. Rev. at 66, 73, supra note 1.
35For instance, the Court has interpreted the 11th Amendment in
a (controversially) state-protective manner partially out of concern
with state revenue. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-16
(1999) (recounting history). The Court’s (also controversial) broad
interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act betrays a similar concern.
National Private Truck Council Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515
U.S. 582, 586 (1995). See similar concerns in connection with the
permissible scope of the federal bankruptcy power in connection with
municipalities, Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District.
No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936); the due process clause in connection
with state revenue collection, McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages andTobacco, Department of Business Regulation of Florida, 496
U.S. 18, 37 (1990); and the ability to order a tax increase as a remedy
for a civil rights violation, Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50 (1990).
36See, for instance, our discussion supra of the various costly tax
mitigation strategies undertaken by interstate businesses.
37Samuel R. Bagenstos, ‘‘Viva Conditional Federal Spending!’’ 37
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 93, 95 (2014).
38See Gamage and Shanske, supra note 23, at 48-50.
39See generally Hellerstein, Hellerstein, and Swain para. 4.25; and
James R. Eads, ‘‘Federal Preemption of Revenue Autonomy,’’ in The
Oxford Handbook of State and Local Government Finance (Robert D.
Ebel and John E. Petersen eds. 2012) (listing those and other ex-
amples).
40Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. section 151 note, last
amended P.L. 113-235, Div. E, Title VI, section 624, Dec. 16, 2014,
128 Stat. 2377, section 1101(a) (‘‘No State or political subdivision
thereof shall impose any of the following taxes during the period
beginning on October 1, 1998, and ending 3 years after the date of the
enactment of this Act — (1) taxes on Internet access, unless such tax
was generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1, 1998;
and (2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce’’).
4149 U.S.C. section 40116(b). There are exceptions for the state in
which a plane takes off and lands, but such taxes may not impose an
‘‘unreasonable burden.’’ 49 U.S.C. section 40116(d).
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carrier,42 and from imposing any tax that discriminates
against railroads.43 Moreover, Congress permits the states to
tax interstate motor fuels only if they are members of the
International Fuel Tax Agreement.44 Similarly, states are
permitted to tax mobile phones only if they follow Con-
gress’s sourcing rules.45 Further, state taxes are broadly pre-
empted by ERISA,46 and the federal government has capped
the amount of franchise fees that a cable company can be
required to pay a state or local government.47 Congress has
forbidden the states from taxing the retirement income of
nonresidents48 or taxing the purchase of food with Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits.49
One way of interpreting that profusion might be to
argue, as Fatale has, that the federal government has nibbled
its way into imposing large limitations on the states.50 That
is why it is presumably not a problem for Fatale that his
analysis would seemingly sweep away both narrow and
broad federal limitations.
Yet we think the sweep of Fatale’s argument weakens his
position. Disruption matters.51 The pragmatic Court that
thought the Medicaid expansion went too far presumably
will not be eager to cast doubt on so many existing federal
laws. Further, these examples indicate how odd it is to
withdraw taxation from the realm of ‘‘commerce.’’ Many of
these provisions relate to interstate commerce directly.52
That is, these provisions regulate instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce (for example, railroads); emerging interstate
commerce problems (for example, mobile telephones);
problems uniquely affecting interstate business (for ex-
ample, nexus); new interstate bases (for example, the inter-
net); and taxpayer mobility (for example, pensions). In
short, it is a burden on interstate commerce for each state to
tax mobile phones differently. It would also be a burden —
and to some extent it already is — if every state were to tax
remote sellers using different nexus rules.
Or, as Congress put matters when it restricted the ability
of states to tax interstate pensions:
Congress has the clear authority under the commerce
clause of the Constitution to prohibit State taxation of
nonresidents’ pension income. The activity that is
being regulated under H.R. 394 is the economic
relationship between a State and its former resident.
The transactions at issue are both within the stream of
interstate commerce. Both the person who has retired
and the pension payments have crossed State lines.53
If those hooks were to be insufficient to ground an
exertion of congressional power under the commerce clause,
it seems that many other federal laws would be in jeopardy
and solutions to national problems made much more diffi-
cult.
C. Other Clauses and Other Expedients
NFIB v. Sebelius is well known because the Court decided
that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was a
valid exercise of congressional power under the taxing
power. The commerce clause54 is thus not the only enumer-
ated power (even if it sometimes seems that way). Thus, in
thinking through the constitutionality of other policy expe-
dients meant to mitigate the tax cannibalization problem,
other clauses should be considered. We should emphasize
that the commerce clause probably is sufficient to ground
most of the other expedients we have outlined to address the
tax cannibalization problem, such as narrowing the reach of
the state corporate income tax by expanding P.L. 86-272.
First, most obviously, there is the spending power as
undergirding Congress’s ability to bribe the states not to use
the corporate income tax.55 That power was limited by
NFIB v. Sebelius, but only in the extremes.56 Congress
retains the power to place conditions on funds in order to
achieve policy goals that it could not achieve directly under
Article I of the Constitution. Thus, even if the outright ban
of the state corporate income tax would not pass muster as
an exercise of the commerce power, Congress could bribe
the states to reduce use of the tax by using the spending
power so long as the pressure that Congress brings to bear is
not comparable to the deprivation of Medicaid funding.
Congress could use its spending power just because it is
4249 U.S.C. section 14505 (‘‘A State or political subdivision thereof
may not collect or levy a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge on — (1)
a passenger traveling in interstate commerce by motor carrier’’).
4349 U.S.C. section 11501.
4449 U.S.C. section 31705(a) (‘‘Reporting requirements. — After
September 30, 1996, a State may establish, maintain, or enforce a law
or regulation that has a fuel use tax reporting requirement (including
any tax reporting form) only if the requirement conforms with the
International Fuel Tax Agreement’’).
454 U.S.C. section 117(b).
4629 U.S.C. section 1144(a) (general preemption provision); and
29 U.S.C. section 1144(b)(5)(B)(i) (specifically not excluding state
taxes from scope of preemption).
4747 U.S.C.A. section 542(b) (‘‘For any twelve-month period, the
franchise fees paid by a cable operator with respect to any cable system
shall not exceed 5 percent of such cable operator’s gross revenues
derived in such period from the operation of the cable system to
provide cable services’’).
484 U.S.C. section 114.
497 U.S.C. section 2013(a).
50Fatale, 2012 Mich. St. L. Rev., supra note 1, at 50-51.
51As Solum might put it, even those critical of the post-New Deal
expansion of federal power often advocate for the second best option of
a ‘‘Frozen New Deal Settlement.’’ Solum, supra note 11, at 54.
52See the core of the commerce power as elucidated by the Court in
Morrison, supra note 17.
53Report 104-89 at 5.
54Along with the necessary and proper clause and supremacy
clause.
55U.S. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 1.
56NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (‘‘We have long recog-
nized that Congress may use this power to grant federal funds to the
States, and may condition such a grant upon the States’ taking certain
actions that Congress could not require them to take’’) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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seeking to mitigate the tax cannibalization problem, no
interstate commerce hook required.
And then there is the taxing power, which could also
undergird federal efforts to limit use of the state corporate
income tax.57 As NFIB v. Sebelius made clear, the taxing
power is in some ways also broader than the commerce
power. Thus, the federal government cannot regulate inac-
tivity, but it can tax it.58 The federal government could
perhaps not ban the use of the corporate income tax, but it
could make that tax much less appealing by limiting — or
even eliminating — its deductibility from federal taxes.
Likewise, the federal government could limit the appeal of
state tax incentives by taxing their value, perhaps even at a
special high rate. Such forms of federal action would also
likely be supported by the 16th Amendment (and the
supremacy clause). It is up to the federal government how it
wishes to structure its income tax, including its deduc-
tions.59 This line of argument suggests that the federal
government might seek to protect its tax base by banning
overlapping bases altogether. Our elucidation of the tax
cannibalization problem indicates that there is a big prob-
lem here, and simple federal preemption would be justified,
underwritten by the supremacy clause. Yet the pragmatic
reasoning of NFIB v. Sebelius suggests that an otherwise
unobjectionable exercise of an enumerated power can go too
far if it overly undermines the current operation of states,
especially their revenue function.
IV. Conclusion
We have revisited questions about the extent of federal
power over state taxation and, in the end, must conclude
that the question remains open. Nevertheless, we think the
crucial point is that what we take to be the consensus view is
still the best answer based on current doctrine. The federal
government almost certainly can impose significant restric-
tions on state taxing power, though within limits.
But is that the right answer? We think so. There is clearly
a tension between respecting the states’ substantial au-
tonomy and granting the federal government sufficient
power to address national problems. There is no perfect
formula, but we think the current consensus, uncertain
around the edges as it may be, is reasonable and perhaps the
best that can be done.
57U.S. Const., Art. I, section 8, cl. 1.
58NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
59New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934)
(‘‘The power to tax income like that of the new corporation is plain and
extends to the gross income. Whether and to what extent deductions
shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is
clear provision therefore can any particular deduction be allowed’’).
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